THOMAS AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL REASON IN GERMAIN GRISEZ'S INTERPRETATION OF NATURAL LAW: QUESTION 94, ARTICLE 2, IA-IIAE OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

In this article we address a comment Germain Grisez makes on the first principle of practical reason by Thomas Aquinas, presented in question 94, article 2, Ia-IIae [= first part of the second part] of the Summa Theologiae. The purpose of this comment is to confront and clarify that the interpretations made about the first principle of practical reason, until now, were wrong. The methodology used by Grisez in the hermeneutics of the first principle was based on the analysis of the Thomasian concepts presented in the aforementioned question 94. Through this analysis, Grisez concludes that the first principle of practical reason concerns a prescription, not an obligation. Therefore, to understand it as a commandment would be a mistake. Thus, emptying the morality of the first principle, such an interpretation will reverberate and profoundly influence the structuring of the Neoclassical School authors' thought. At the end, we decline some criticisms about Grizez's interpretation of the first principle of practical reason.