The equivalence of profit-sharing licensing and per-unit royalty licensing

被引：24
作者：
Niu, Shuai [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ New S Wales, Australian Sch Business, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
来源：
ECONOMIC MODELLING | 2013年 / 32卷
关键词：
Licensing; Profitability; Welfare; R-AND-D; QUANTITY COMPETITION; PRICE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econmod.2013.01.033
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a duopoly with symmetric product differentiations, we prove that profit-sharing licensing and per-unit royalty licensing are equivalent to each other regarding both the profitability and the welfare influences. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：10 / 14
页数：5
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