The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation

被引:35
作者
Koch, Christian [1 ]
Penczynski, Stefan P. [2 ]
机构
[1] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Div Social Sci, POB 129188, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
[2] Univ East Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich Res Pk, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
关键词
Auctions; Winner's curse; Conditional reasoning; Beliefs; STRATEGIC THINKING; VALUE AUCTIONS; QUANTAL RESPONSE; NORMAL-FORM; GAMES; INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIUM; RATIONALIZE; RELAXATION; EXPLAIN;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In explaining the winner's curse, recent approaches have focused on one of two cognitive processes: conditional reasoning and belief formation. We provide the first joint experimental analysis of the role of these two obstacles. First, we observe that overbidding decreases significantly between a simple common-value auction and a transformed version of this auction that does not require conditional reasoning. Second, assistance in belief formation leads to comparable behavioral changes in both games. The two effects are of similar magnitude and amplify each other when jointly present. We conclude that the combination and the interaction of the two cognitive processes in auctions lead to relatively low strategic sophistication compared to other domains. The study's focus on games' objective cognitive challenges is potentially useful for improving predictions across games and complements the common focus on behavioral models and their explanatory power. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:57 / 102
页数:46
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