Co-evolution in negotiation games

被引：1

作者：

Murakami, Y ^{[1
]}

Sato, H ^{[1
]}

Namatame, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Def Acad, Dept Comp Sci, Yokosuka, Kanagawa 2398686, Japan

来源：

ICCIMA 2001: FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND MULTIMEDIA APPLICATIONS, PROCEEDINGS | 2001年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/ICCIMA.2001.970473

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we focus on the mechanism of co-evolution in the negotiation situations, Me formulate negotiation situations as hawk-dove games. It is an interesting question to answer how the society gropes its way to-wards equilibrium in an imperfect world it-hen self-interested agents learn each other in order to improve the rules of interaction, It is known the mixed strategy, will result in equilibrium in hawk-dove games, and both hawks and doves coexist. In this paper we consider evolutionary dynamics with local matching and investigate the role of the mutual learning. Me show that all agents gradually, learn to behave as doves, which result in social efficiency.

引用

页码：241 / 245

页数：5

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