Informational requirements of social choice rules

被引：2

作者：

Sato, Shin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Keio Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Minato Ku, Tokyo, Japan

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2009年 / 57卷 / 02期

关键词：

Antiplurality rule; Minimal informational requirement; Plurality rule; Social choice rule; PLURALITY RULE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The required amount of information to make a social choice is the cost of information processing, and it is a practically important feature of social choice rules. We introduce informational aspects into the analysis of social choice rules and prove that (i) if an anonymous, neutral, and monotonic social choice rule operates on minimal informational requirements, then it is a supercorrespondence of either the plurality rule or the antiplurality rule, and (ii) if the social choice rule is furthermore Pareto efficient, then it is a supercorrespondence of the plurality rule. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：188 / 198

页数：11

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