Does synergy rescue the evolution of cooperation? An analysis for homogeneous populations with non-overlapping generations

被引:14
作者
Ohtsuki, Hisashi [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Grad Univ Adv Studies, Sch Adv Sci, Dept Evolutionary Studies Biosyst, Hayama, Kanagawa 2400193, Japan
[2] Japan Sci & Technol Agcy, PRESTO, Kawaguchi, Saitama 3320012, Japan
关键词
Evolutionary game theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; Synergy; Population structure; INCLUSIVE FITNESS; KIN SELECTION; FREQUENCY-DEPENDENCE; VISCOUS POPULATIONS; STRONG RECIPROCITY; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; HAMILTONS RULE; ALTRUISM; DYNAMICS; GAMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.030
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Recent developments of social evolution theory have revealed conditions under which cooperation is favored by natural selection. Effects of population structure on the evolution of cooperation have been one of the central questions in this issue, and inclusive fitness analyses have unveiled two different selective forces that favor cooperation; the direct fitness effect to the helper and the indirect fitness benefit to the helper via its kin. Although these theoretical frameworks have made a significant contribution to our understanding of cooperative traits, there is still one factor to be taken into account, synergy. Synergy means a nonlinear effect that arises when two individuals help each other. In other words, it represents deviation from additivity, to which inclusive fitness theory has paid relatively little attention. Here I provide a theoretical result on the possibility that synergy favors the evolution of cooperation. For homogeneously structured populations with non-overlapping generations, I show that incorporating synergistic effects does not rescue the evolution of cooperation. Potential factors that could enable synergy to rescue the evolution of cooperation are also discussed. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:20 / 28
页数:9
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