Inflation contract, central bank transparency and model uncertainty

被引:8
作者
Dai, Meixing [1 ]
Spyromitros, Eleftherios [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Strasbourg, BETA, F-67085 Strasbourg, France
[2] Democritus Univ Thrace, Dept Int Econ Relat & Dev, Komotini Campus 69100, Greece
关键词
Inflation contract; Model uncertainty; Model robustness; Robust monetary policy; Central bank transparency (opacity); OPTIMAL MONETARY-POLICY; WALSH CONTRACT; ACCOUNTABILITY; CREDIBILITY; PREFERENCES;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2012.06.021
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using a New-Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine how the robust monetary policy could be modified by a linear inflation contract when a central bank is opaque about its preference for model robustness. It is shown that a central bank must limit this preference and opacity about it to ensure the dynamic stability of the economy. An optimal inflation contract with a zero penalty rate provides no incentive for a central bank to be opaque. The latter must rebalance the benefit of avoiding very bad outcomes in worst case scenarios and the economic costs due to higher macroeconomic volatility. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2371 / 2381
页数:11
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