Courts and relational contracts

被引:220
作者
Johnson, S [1 ]
McMillan, J
Woodruff, C
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Univ Calif San Diego, San Diego, CA 92103 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/jleo/18.1.221
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Post-communist countries offer new evidence on the relative importance of courts and relationships in enforcing contracts. Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positive effect on the level of trust shown in new relationships between firms and their customers. Well-functioning courts also encourage entrepreneurs to try out new suppliers. Courts are particularly important when specific investments are needed for a relationship to develop. While relationships can sustain existing interactions, workable courts help new interactions to start and develop.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 277
页数:57
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