Hume, a Scottish Locke? Comments on Terence Penelhum's Hume

被引:2
作者
Ainslie, Donald C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Dept Philosophy, Toronto, ON M5R 2M8, Canada
关键词
Penelhum; perception; idea; Hume; scepticism; Locke;
D O I
10.1080/00455091.2012.981006
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Where Terence Penelhum sees a deep continuity between John Locke's theory of ideas and David Hume's theory of perceptions, I argue that the two philosophers disagree over some fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind. While Locke treats ideas as imagistic objects that we recognize as such by a special kind of inner consciousness, Hume thinks that we do not normally recognize the imagistic content of our perceptions, and instead unselfconsciously take ourselves to sense a shared public world. My disagreement with Penelhum over Hume's debt to Locke helps to explain our disagreement over the nature of Hume's scepticism.
引用
收藏
页码:161 / 170
页数:10
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