Elections, leaders, and the composition of government spending

被引:78
作者
Brender, Adi [1 ]
Drazen, Allan [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Bank Israel, Haifa, Israel
[2] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
Budget; Leaders; Economic policy; Fiscal policy; Expenditure composition; POLITICAL CYCLES; BUDGET DEFICITS; PARTY PLATFORMS; FISCAL-POLICY; ECONOMY; GROWTH; CREDIBILITY; DEMOCRACY; MANDATES; SIZE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Do elections allow voters to express their policy preferences, with change in government spending patterns following the election of a new leader? How long does it take for the composition of government spending to change following a change in leadership? Or, do significant spending changes precede (rather than follow) elections, with incumbents using significant changes in spending composition as an electoral tool? Using a dataset we created on government expenditure composition in 71 democracies over 1972-2009, we examine the relation between elections and significant changes in the composition of government spending. We find that leaders' replacements have no significant short-run effect on expenditure composition, even after controlling for various political and economic variables. Over the medium-term leadership changes are associated with larger changes in expenditure composition, but only in developed countries. We also find that election years are associated with larger expenditure composition changes in established democracies, but not in new democracies, which were found in our previous work to increase their overall level of expenditures in election years. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:18 / 31
页数:14
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