Is there a case for non-discrimination in the international protection of intellectual property?

被引：14

作者：

Geng, Difei ^{[1
]}

Saggi, Kamal ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, Nashville, TN 37235 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 97卷 / 01期

关键词：

International patent protection; National treatment; Discrimination; Welfare; Trade barriers; NATIONAL TREATMENT; TRADE AGREEMENTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.05.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We evaluate the case for non-discrimination in international patent protection. When trade is not subject to any frictions/barriers, requiring national treatment (NT) does not affect the rate of innovation (and welfare) since unfavorable discrimination suffered abroad by innovators in the absence of NT is fully offset by favorable discrimination enjoyed by them at home. When trade barriers exist, however, such international offsetting in patent protection is incomplete and innovation incentives are actually lower under NT. By lumping domestic and foreign patent protection together, NT blunts the overall effectiveness of patent protection in incentivizing innovation in the presence of trade barriers. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：14 / 28

页数：15

共 22 条

[1] An economic theory of GATT [J].