Donation of richer individual can support cooperation in spatial voluntary prisoner's dilemma game

被引:4
作者
Mao, Deming [1 ]
Niu, Zhenxi [2 ]
机构
[1] China Elect Technol Cyber Secur Co Ltd, Chengdu 610041, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Mech Engn, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
关键词
Donation model; Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma game; Voluntary participate; SOCIAL-BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; RESOLVE;
D O I
10.1016/j.chaos.2018.01.014
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
The compassionate behavior is present throughout the human society, and rich people always could not help having sympathy for poor individual. Inspired by this fact, we consider a donation model to describe the emergency and maintenance of cooperation with voluntary participate in spatial prisoner's dilemma game and we study this model on a square lattice. In detail, when the focal player has the least income in the group which includes his nearest four neighbors and himself, one of his neighbors who has the highest income will donate some proportion of his extra money to him. On the other hand, if focal individual is not the poorest, he will donate some incomes to his poorest neighbor. Through numeric simulation, we conclude that our donation model can promote the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Especially, the larger proportion payoffrich people can contribute, the higher level of cooperation we can get. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:66 / 70
页数:5
相关论文
共 37 条
[1]   Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a small-world networked game [J].
Chen, Xiaojie ;
Wang, Long .
PHYSICAL REVIEW E, 2008, 77 (01)
[2]   Historical payoff promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game [J].
Deng, Zhenghong ;
Ma, Chunmiao ;
Mao, Xudong ;
Wang, Shenglan ;
Niu, Zhenxi ;
Gao, Li .
CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2017, 104 :1-5
[3]   Altruistic punishment in humans [J].
Fehr, E ;
Gächter, S .
NATURE, 2002, 415 (6868) :137-140
[4]   Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: Testing "conditional cooperation" in a field experiment [J].
Frey, BS ;
Meier, S .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2004, 94 (05) :1717-1722
[5]   Coevolutionary dynamics of opinions and networks: From diversity to uniformity [J].
Fu, Feng ;
Wang, Long .
PHYSICAL REVIEW E, 2008, 78 (01)
[6]   Historical payoffpromotes cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma game [J].
Geng, Yini ;
Shen, Chen ;
Guo, Hao ;
Chu, Chen ;
Yu, Dalei ;
Shi, Lei .
CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2017, 105 :145-149
[7]   Environment promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial voluntary prisoner's dilemma game [J].
Guo, Hao ;
Shen, Chen ;
Dai, Dameng ;
Zhang, Mi ;
Chu, Chen ;
Shi, Lei .
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 2017, 315 :47-53
[8]   GENETICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 2 [J].
HAMILTON, WD .
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1964, 7 (01) :17-&
[9]  
He J. Z., 2014, PLOS ONE, V9
[10]   Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation [J].
He, Jun-Zhou ;
Wang, Rui-Wu ;
Jensen, Christopher X. J. ;
Li, Yao-Tang .
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 2015, 5