Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations

被引:265
作者
Denis, DJ [1 ]
Sarin, A
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Grad Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Santa Clara Univ, Leavey Coll Business & Adm, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
关键词
ownership structure; board composition;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00008-2
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the equity ownership structure and board composition of a sample of 583 firms over the ten-year period 1983-1992. Our evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of firms exhibit large changes in ownership and board structure in any given year. These changes are correlated with one another and are not reversed in subsequent years. Ownership and board changes are strongly related to top executive turnover, prior stock price performance, and corporate control threats, but only weakly related to changes in firm-specific determinants of ownership and board structure. Furthermore, large ownership changes are typically preceded by economic shocks and followed by asset restructurings. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:187 / 223
页数:37
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