In this article I focus on two conflicting directions of supraindividualism concerning joint agency. The two representative authors here are Schmitt (2003b) and Pettit (2003). The tension lies between assuming there is a joint agent, without ontologically committing to such an agent, any reference to it being just a facon de parler, or, on the contrary, assuming there is a joint agent and ontologically committing to it. The problem of joint agency is discussed in relation to the problem of joint action. My aim is to provide a critical discussion of the problem of joint agency. For this, I provide an overview of Schmitt's and Pettit's approaches to joint agency, and an example meant to raise some doubts regarding Schmitt's criterion for possessing agency. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, I discuss the key concepts concerning this problem. In Section 2, I present Schmitt's noncommittal approach to joint agency. In Section 3, I present Pettit's committal approach. In Section 4 and 5, I discuss Schmitt's criterion for being an agent and why there cannot be a joint agent in the strict existential sense. His criterion relies on a system of beliefs that should be possessed by an agent. In this context, I formulate a critique of this requirement. In the last Section, I follow some of Pettit's (2003) and Gilbert's (2004) ideas to provide an example concerning the interaction between individual and group beliefs, which also supports the critique of Schmitt's criterion.
