Government intervention through informed trading in financial markets

被引：4

作者：

Huang, Shao'an ^{[1
]}

Qiu, Zhigang ^{[2
]}

Wang, Gaowang ^{[1
]}

Wang, Xiaodan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Shandong Univ, Ctr Econ Res, Jinan, Peoples R China

[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2022年 / 141卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Government intervention; Trading; Price stability; Price efficiency; CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104379

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a theoretical model of government intervention in which a government with private information trades strategically with other market participants to achieve its policy goal of stabilizing asset prices. When the government has precise information and prioritizes its policy goal, both the government and the informed insider engage in reversed trading strategies, but they trade against each other. Government intervention can improve both market liquidity and price efficiency, and the effectiveness of government intervention depends crucially on the quality of information possessed by the government. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：19

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