Disappointment and the Optimal Insurance Contract

被引：5

作者：

Huang, Rachel J. ^{[1
,3
]}

Shih, Pai-Ta ^{[2
]}

Tzeng, Larry Y. ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Taiwan Univ Sci & Technol, Grad Inst Finance, Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Finance, Taipei 10764, Taiwan

[3] Natl Chengchi Univ, RIRC, Taipei, Taiwan

来源：

GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW | 2012年 / 37卷 / 02期

关键词：

disappointment; optimal insurance contract; deductible; coinsurance; REFERENCE POINTS; DECISION-MAKING; REGRET; UNCERTAINTY; CHOICE; DESIGN; CONSTRAINT; POLICY; RISK; AVERSION;

D O I：

10.1057/grir.2012.2

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the optimal insurance contract under disappointment theory. We show that, when the individuals anticipate disappointment, there are two types of optimal insurance contract. The first type contains a deductible and a coinsurance above the deductible. We find that zero marginal cost is just a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a zero deductible. The second type has no deductible and the optimal insurance starts with full coverage for small losses and includes a coinsurance above an upper value of the full coverage. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2012) 37, 258-284. doi:10.1057/grir.2012.2; published online 31 July 2012

引用

页码：258 / 284

页数：27

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