Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretic analysis

被引：13
|
作者：
Balsmeier, Benjamin [1 ,2 ]
Bermig, Andreas [3 ]
Dilger, Alexander [2 ]
机构：
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Dept Managerial Econ Strategy & Innovat, Naamsestr 69, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
[2] Univ Munster, Inst Org Econ, D-48151 Munster, Germany
[3] McKinsey & Co Inc, D-80333 Munich, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2013年 / 91卷
关键词：
Applied game theory; Co-determination; Corporate governance; Power index; WORKS COUNCILS; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; EFFICIENCY; SIZE; CODETERMINATION; DIVERSIFICATION; OWNERSHIP;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The debate on employee representation on corporate boards has received considerable attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing discussion by applying power indices from game theory to examine the actual voting power of employees on boards and its effect on firm performance. Based on unique panel data on the largest listed companies in Germany, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between labor power and Tobin's Q. Moderate employee participation in corporate board decision-making can enhance firm value. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码：51 / 74
页数：24
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