Supplementary health insurance as a tool for risk-selection in mandatory basic health insurance markets

被引:25
|
作者
Paolucci, Francesco [1 ]
Schut, Erik [1 ]
Beck, Konstantin [2 ]
Gress, Stefan [3 ]
Van De Voorde, Carine [4 ]
Zmora, Irit
机构
[1] Erasmus Univ, Dept Hlth Policy & Management, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[2] Univ Zurich, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Appl Sci Fulda, Dept Hlth Sci, Fulda, Germany
[4] Catholic Univ Louvain, Ctr Econ Studies, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S1744133107004124
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
As the share of supplementary health insurance (SI) in health care finance is likely to grow, SI may become an increasingly attractive tool for risk-selection in basic health insurance (BI). In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework to assess the probability that insurers will use SI for favourable risk-selection in BI. We apply our framework to five countries in which risk-selection via SI is feasible: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For each country, we review the available evidence of SI being used as selection device. We find that the probability that SI is and will be used for risk-selection substantially varies across countries. Finally, we discuss several strategies for policy makers to reduce the chance that SI will be used for risk-selection in BI markets.
引用
收藏
页码:173 / 192
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] MANDATORY BASIC HEALTH INSURANCE IN SEGMENTED MARKETS
    Beteta, Edmundo
    Willington, Manuel
    ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMIA, 2009, 36 (02): : 217 - 241
  • [2] Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets
    Aizawa, Naoki
    Kim, You Suk
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2018, 108 (03): : 828 - 867
  • [3] Choice of insurer for basic health insurance restricted by supplementary insurance
    Daniëlle M. I. D. Duijmelinck
    Wynand P. M. M. van de Ven
    The European Journal of Health Economics, 2014, 15 : 737 - 746
  • [4] Choice of insurer for basic health insurance restricted by supplementary insurance
    Duijmelinck, Danielle M. I. D.
    van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M.
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 2014, 15 (07): : 737 - 746
  • [5] Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection
    Boone, Jan
    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2015, 128 : 50 - 58
  • [6] SELECTION, RISK SELECTION AND HEALTH INSURANCE
    Zweifel, Peter
    REVUE EUROPEENNE DES SCIENCES SOCIALES, 2006, 44 (134): : 317 - 334
  • [7] Risk Adjustment in Health Insurance Markets
    van Kleef, Richard C.
    van Vliet, Rene C. J. A.
    Oskam, Michel
    MEDICAL CARE, 2024, 62 (11) : 767 - 772
  • [8] Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets
    Neudeck, W
    Podczeck, K
    JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1996, 15 (04) : 387 - 408
  • [9] A model to decompose the performance of supplementary private health insurance markets
    Reiner Leidl
    International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2008, 8
  • [10] A model to decompose the performance of supplementary private health insurance markets
    Leidl, Reiner
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE & ECONOMICS, 2008, 8 (03): : 193 - 208