CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities

被引：37

作者：

Bouslah, Kais ^{[1
]}

Linares-Zegarra, Jose ^{[2
]}

M'Zali, Bouchra ^{[3
]}

Scholtens, Bert ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ St Andrews, Sch Management, Ctr Responsible Banking & Finance, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland

[2] Univ Essex, Essex Business Sch, Colchester, Essex, England

[3] Univ Quebec Montreal, Ecole Sci Gest, AICRI, CRSDD ESG UQAM, Quebec City, PQ, Canada

[4] Univ St Andrews, Sch Management, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland

[5] Univ Groningen, Fac Econ & Business, Groningen, Netherlands

来源：

BRITISH ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2018年 / 50卷 / 01期

关键词：

Executive compensation; CEO risk-taking incentives; Socially irresponsible activities; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; RESPONSIBILITY; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; IMPACT; REPUTATION; RESPOND; WEALTH; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.bar.2017.05.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992-2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risk-taking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：76 / 92

页数：17

共 50 条

[31] Risk-taking incentives and risk-talking outcomes
Mishra, Dev R.
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2024, 160
[32] The Effect of Banking Deregulation on Borrowing Firms' Risk-Taking Incentives
Bens, Daniel
Liao, Scott
Su, Barbara
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2023, 40 (02) : 1350 - 1387
[33] CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies
Cain, Matthew D.
McKeon, Stephen B.
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 2016, 51 (01) : 139 - 164
[34] Good for managers, bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility
Mayberry, Michael
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2020, 47 (9-10) : 1182 - 1214
[35] Required CEO stock ownership: Consequences for risk-taking and compensation
Brisley, Neil
Cai, Jay
Tu Nguyen
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2021, 66
[36] Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage
Rogers, DA
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2002, 26 (2-3) : 271 - 295
[37] Debt Incentives and Bank Risk-Taking
Chu, Yongqiang
Qiu, Mingming
REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, 2021, 49 (03) : 778 - 808
[38] Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions
Jamshed Iqbal
Sami Vähämaa
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2019, 53 : 1229 - 1258
[39] Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Armstrong, Christopher S.
Vashishtha, Rahul
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2012, 104 (01) : 70 - 88
[40] Managerial incentives for risk-taking and internal capital allocation
Casavecchia, Lorenzo
Suh, Ja Young
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2017, 42 (03) : 428 - 461

← 1 2 3 4 5 →