Emergency supplies requisition negotiation principle of government in disasters

被引:7
|
作者
Liu, Jia [1 ]
Xie, Kefan [2 ]
机构
[1] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Informat & Safety Engn, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[2] Wuhan Univ Technol, Wuhan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Disaster; Game theory; Negotiation; Emergency management; Supplies requisition; GAME; ALLOCATION; FRAMEWORK; PRODUCT; DEMAND; MODEL;
D O I
10.1108/K-07-2015-0192
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Purpose - When disasters occur, the Chinese national or local government and their relevant departments (hereinafter referred to as the government) probably need to acquire emergency supplies from suppliers. Before concluding a transaction, the public officials usually negotiate the quality and price of the emergency supplies with the suppliers. They expect to achieve the best relief effect while the suppliers want to maximize their own interests. Therefore, in order to help the government acquire inexpensive emergency supplies with high quality in a short time, the purpose of this paper is to examine the negotiation process and proposes a negotiation principle for the staff. Design/methodology/approach - This paper first elaborates the characteristics and impact factors of emergency supplies requisition negotiation. Then it establishes a model describing the negotiation on price and quality of emergency supplies between the public officials and suppliers. Afterwards, it proposes an algorithm which can estimate the success rate of the negotiation. Finally, the paper employs the conclusion of the model and algorithm to analyze the emergency supplies requisition negotiation process during the China Lushan earthquake. Findings - This paper proposes a "WRAD" principle of emergency supplies requisition negotiation of public officials in disasters. First, they should ensure the requisition price is not too low. Second, they would widen the difference between the high price and low price. Third, it is best for them to follow the principle of "ascending negotiation and descending choice" while selecting multiple suppliers to negotiate. Originality/value - This paper establishes a model to study the emergency supplies requisition negotiation process between the public officials and suppliers based on evolutionary game theory. The model assumes that both the public officials and suppliers are not fully rational individuals, and they need time to consult with each other to find out the optimal solution. This paper proposes an innovative action principle of the public officials during the negotiation process which can help it to acquire inexpensive, high-quality, emergency supplies within a short period from the suppliers.
引用
收藏
页码:1174 / 1193
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Preparation and scheduling system of emergency supplies in disasters
    Jia, Liu
    Xie Kefan
    KYBERNETES, 2015, 44 (03) : 423 - 439
  • [2] Government regulation of emergency supplies under the epidemic crisis
    Chen, Junlong
    Sun, Chaoqun
    Zhang, Ruihan
    Liu, Jiali
    ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA, 2022, 35 (01): : 2809 - 2835
  • [3] An emergency supplies procurement strategy based on a bidirectional option contract
    Meng, Qingchun
    Kao, Zhiping
    Guo, Ying
    Bao, Chunbing
    SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLANNING SCIENCES, 2023, 87
  • [4] Shift from a Lag Government to Anticipatory Government -On Emergency Management in the Case of Jiangxi Natural Disasters
    Lin Qiong
    PROCEEDINGS OF 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (5TH), VOL II, 2009, : 379 - 385
  • [6] Principles of emergency management in disasters
    Peleg, K
    Michaelson, M
    Shapira, SC
    Aharonson-Daniel, L
    ADVANCES IN RENAL REPLACEMENT THERAPY, 2003, 10 (02): : 117 - 121
  • [7] Prepositioning emergency supplies under uncertainty: a parametric optimization method
    Bai, Xuejie
    Gao, Jinwu
    Liu, Yankui
    ENGINEERING OPTIMIZATION, 2018, 50 (07) : 1114 - 1133
  • [8] Optimization on cooperative government and enterprise supplies repertories for maritime emergency: A study case in China
    Ai, Yunfei
    Zhang, Qi
    ADVANCES IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, 2019, 11 (05)
  • [9] Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters
    Cheung, May
    Zhuang, Jun
    DECISION ANALYSIS, 2012, 9 (02) : 156 - 164
  • [10] A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society
    Zhang, Meng
    Kong, Zhaojun
    COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, 2022, 169