Non-Interactive Authenticated Key Agreement over the Mobile Communication Network

A key agreement scheme is an important technique to establish a common secret over an insecure communication environment such as the Internet. In this paper, we elaborate on the merits of self-certified public key systems and bilinear pairing cryptosystems to propose an efficient and secure non-interactive authenticated key agreement (NI-AKA) scheme. The security of our scheme is proved to be computationally equivalent to the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP). In addition, the proposed scheme has the following advantages: (i) Two participants can easily establish a shared secret key between them without further interactions, so as to greatly reduce the possibility of leaking any security information of the shared secret key. (ii) Combining with self-certified public key systems, the proposed scheme makes it unnecessary to verify each other's public key in advance, since the authenticity of the public keys is simultaneously validated when the mutually shared secret key is correctly established. (iii) Based on the bilinear pairing cryptosystems over elliptic curves, our scheme is suitable for mobile applications with limited computing power and insufficient storage space, such as PDAs and cellular phones, etc.