Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?

被引：14

作者：

Ghosal, Sayantan ^{[1
,2
]}

Thampanishvong, Kannika ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England

[2] Thailand Dev Res Inst, Bangkok 10310, Thailand

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 89卷 / 01期

关键词：

Sovereign debt; Coordination; Moral hazard; Collective Action Clauses; Ex ante; Ex post; SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES; MORAL HAZARD; EQUILIBRIUM; COSTS; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.04.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information. Conditional on default, we characterize the interim efficient CAC threshold and show that strengthening CACs away from unanimity results in interim welfare gains. However, once the impact of strengthening CACs on debtor's incentives is taken into account, we demonstrate the robust possibility of a conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency. We calibrate our model to quantify such a welfare trade-off and discuss the policy implications of our results. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：68 / 78

页数：11

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