The Effect of CEO Option Compensation on the Capital Structure: A Natural Experiment

被引:13
作者
Tosun, Onur Kemal [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Finance, Coventry, W Midlands, England
关键词
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; STOCK-OPTIONS; CORPORATE; FIRM; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1111/fima.12116
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Firms simultaneously choose both their capital and their executive compensation structure. Using the Internal Revenue Code 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to compensation structure in a natural experiment setting, I identify firm leverage changes as a result of chief executive officer (CEO) option compensation changes. The evidence provides strong support for debt agency theory. Firms appear to decrease leverage when CEOs are paid with more options and when CEO options become a higher percentage of future cash flows. The findings are robust to controlling for corporate governance and convertible debt.
引用
收藏
页码:953 / 979
页数:27
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