The time between intention and action affects the experience of action

被引:11
|
作者
Vinding, Mikkel C. [1 ]
Jensen, Mads [1 ]
Overgaard, Morten [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Aarhus Univ, Ctr Functionally Integrat, Neurosci & Mind Lab, Cognit Neurosci Res Unit, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
[2] Aalborg Univ, Ctr Cognit Neurosci, Dept Commun & Psychol, Aalborg, Denmark
来源
FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE | 2015年 / 9卷
关键词
intention; intentional binding; motor planning; proximal intention; distal intention; delayed intentions; sense of agency; experience of action; DELAYED INTENTIONS; CUE INTEGRATION; AGENCY; SENSE; BINDING; MEMORY; SELF; FRAMEWORK; AWARENESS;
D O I
10.3389/fnhum.2015.00366
中图分类号
Q189 [神经科学];
学科分类号
071006 ;
摘要
We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal intentions (i.e., intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e., intentions with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action. The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions. This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on the experience of action.
引用
收藏
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The conscious experience of action and intention
    Strother, Lars
    Obhi, Sukhvinder Singh
    EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RESEARCH, 2009, 198 (04) : 535 - 539
  • [2] The conscious experience of action and intention
    Lars Strother
    Sukhvinder Singh Obhi
    Experimental Brain Research, 2009, 198 : 535 - 539
  • [3] Intentional Binding Is Unrelated to Action Intention
    Kirsch, Wladimir
    Kunde, Wilfried
    Herbort, Oliver
    JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-HUMAN PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE, 2019, 45 (03) : 378 - 385
  • [4] Intention, attention and the temporal experience of action
    Haggard, Patrick
    Cole, Jonathan
    CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION, 2007, 16 (02) : 211 - 220
  • [5] Subliminal modulation of voluntary action experience: A neuropsychological investigation
    Khalighinejad, N.
    Kunnumpurath, A.
    Bertini, C.
    Ladavas, E.
    Haggard, P.
    CORTEX, 2017, 90 : 58 - 70
  • [6] Distinct electrophysiological potentials for intention in action and prior intention for action
    Vinding, Mikkel C.
    Jensen, Mads
    Overgaard, Morten
    CORTEX, 2014, 50 : 86 - 99
  • [7] Activating memories of depression alters the experience of voluntary action
    Obhi, Sukhvinder S.
    Swiderski, Kristina M.
    Farquhar, Riley
    EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RESEARCH, 2013, 229 (03) : 497 - 506
  • [8] Time for Action: Verbal Action Cues Influence Temporal Binding
    Damen, Tom G. E.
    van Baaren, Rick B.
    Dijksterhuis, Ap
    FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2020, 11
  • [9] A spatial-attentional mechanism underlies action-related distortions of time judgment
    Cao, Liyu
    ELIFE, 2024, 12
  • [10] My action lasts longer: Potential link between subjective time and agency during voluntary action
    Imaizumi, Shu
    Asai, Tomohisa
    CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION, 2017, 51 : 243 - 257