Revisiting a game theoretic framework for the robust railway network design against intentional attacks

被引:35
作者
Perea, Federico [1 ]
Puerto, Justo [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Politecn Valencia, Dept Estadist & Invest Operativa Aplicadas & Cali, Valencia 46022, Spain
[2] Univ Sevilla IMUS, Inst Matemat, Seville 41012, Spain
关键词
Robust network design; Game theory; Protection resource allocation; Equilibrium; RESOURCE-ALLOCATION; INTERDICTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2012.11.015
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper discusses and extends some competitive aspects of the games proposed in an earlier work, where a robust railway network design problem was proposed as a non-cooperative zero-sum game in normal form between a designer/operator and an attacker. Due to the importance of the order of play and the information available to the players at the moment of their decisions, we here extend those previous models by proposing a formulation of this situation as a dynamic game. Besides, we propose a new mathematical programming model that optimizes both the network design and the allocation of security resources over the network. The paper also proposes a model to distribute security resources over an already existing railway network in order to minimize the negative effects of an intentional attack. For the sake of readability, all concepts are introduced with the help of an illustrative example. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:286 / 292
页数:7
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