Evidence models and proof of causation

Situations of causal factual uncertainty are relatively common in law. The problems and difficulties regarding 'factual causation' in law point to the need of 'evidence' and 'proof' models that are adequate and capable to accommodate the tests and methodologies used to explain and demonstrate it in a legal context. Given the configuration of the situations of causal factual uncertainty and the available 'evidence' and 'proof' models, I argue that it is justified to use an 'argumentative-narrative' model for 'proving causation' in law. However, considering that each model of 'evidence' and 'proof' reveals a different kind of 'rationality' that can still be viewed in different ways, I also argue that we must try to match the perspective we have on the 'rationality' behind the chosen model of 'evidence' and 'proof' with the 'rationality' underlying 'causation' in law.