Cryptanalysis of an Enhanced Simple Three-Party Key Exchange Protocol

被引：0

作者：

Kim, Hae-Jung ^{[2
]}

Yoon, Eun-Jun ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kyungil Univ, Sch Comp Engn, 33 Buho Ri, Kyungsan Si 712701, Kyungsangpuk Do, South Korea

[2] Keimyung Univ, Coll Liberal Educ, Taegu 704701, South Korea

来源：

SECURITY TECHNOLOGY | 2011年 / 259卷

关键词：

Authentication; 3PAKE; Password; Three-party key exchange; Network security; Dictionary attack;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

A simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (S-3PAKE) protocols are extremely important to secure communications and are now extensively adopted in network communications. In 2009 et al. pointed out that S-3PAKE protocol, by Lu and Cao for password-authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting, is vulnerable to an off-line dictionary attack. Then, they proposed some countermeasures how to eliminate the security vulnerability of the S-3PAKE. Nevertheless, this paper points out their enhanced S-3PAKE protocol is still vulnerable to undetectable on-line dictionary attacks and off-line dictionary attack unlike their claim.

引用

页码：167 / +

页数：2