Cryptographically transparent Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) proxies

被引:4
作者
Gurbani, Vijay K. [1 ]
Willis, Dean [2 ]
Audet, Francois [3 ]
机构
[1] Bell Labs Alcatel Lucent, Murray Hill, NJ 07974 USA
[2] Cisco Syst, San Jose, CA USA
[3] Nortel Networks, Mississauga, ON, Canada
来源
2007 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS, VOLS 1-14 | 2007年
关键词
communication system privacy; privacy; SIP; TLS; Peer-to-Peer; P2P; P2P-SIP;
D O I
10.1109/ICC.2007.201
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Proxies provide important rendezvous service in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), but it comes at a cost to privacy. A SIP proxy is privy to all of the signaling exchanged between two user agents, even if that signaling is performed over a secure channel (e.g., a Transport Layer Security channel.) This paper proposes and evaluates a mechanism that allows the proxies to create an overlay network between the user agents for rendezvous, and once that is done, the proxies become transparent traffic forwarders. From then onwards, user agents can authenticate each other directly and exchange cryptographically secure signaling traffic over the overlay network created by the proxies. This mechanism is applicable to traditional client/server SIP as well as Peer-to-Peer SIP.
引用
收藏
页码:1185 / +
页数:2
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