A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure

被引：15

作者：

Hu, Xun-Feng ^{[1
]}

Li, Deng-Feng ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Guangzhou Univ, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] Fuzhou Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 2 Xueyuan Rd, Fuzhou 350108, Fujian, Peoples R China

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2018年 / 46卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Transferable utility cooperative game; Coalition structure; Shapley-solidarity value; Owen value; COOPERATION; DIFFERENCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.orl.2017.12.006

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we propose a new kind of players as a compromise between the null player and the A-null player. It turns out that the axiom requiring this kind of players to get zero-payoff together with the well-known axioms of efficiency, additivity, coalitional symmetry, and intra-coalitional symmetry characterize the Shapley-solidarity value. This way, the difference between the Shapely-solidarity value and the Owen value is pinpointed to just one axiom. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：163 / 167

页数：5

共 19 条

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