On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions

被引：7
作者：
Katehakis, Michael N. [1 ]
Puranam, Kartikeya S. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Rutgers Business Sch, Dept Management Sci & Informat Syst, Newark, NJ 07102 USA
[2] Ithaca Coll, Pk Ctr Business & Sustainable Enterprise, Dept Management, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2012年 / 40卷 / 04期
关键词：
Auctions; Dynamic bidding; Newsvendor; Procurement;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2012.03.012
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We investigate the problem of optimal bidding for a firm that in each period procures items to meet a random demand by participating in a finite sequence of auctions. We develop a new model for a firm where its item valuation derives from the sale of the acquired items via their demand distribution, sale price, acquisition cost, salvage value and lost sales. We establish monotonicity properties for the value function and the optimal dynamic bid strategy and we present computations. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：244 / 249
页数：6
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