Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy

被引：3

作者：

Hughes, Nick ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford, Fac Philosophy, Oxford, England

来源：

关键词：

EPISTEMOLOGY;

D O I：

10.1080/09672559.2019.1655949

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：591 / 596

页数：6

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