The Economics of Health Insurance

被引:4
作者
Jha, Saurabh [1 ]
Baker, Tom [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Dept Radiol, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Sch Law, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Kenneth Arrow; uncertainty; Akerlof's lemons; asymmetric information; adverse selection; moral hazard; externality; health insurance; risk classification; market failure; UNCERTAINTY; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacr.2012.09.007
中图分类号
R8 [特种医学]; R445 [影像诊断学];
学科分类号
1002 ; 100207 ; 1009 ;
摘要
Insurance plays an important role in the United States, most importantly in but not limited to medical care. The authors introduce basic economic concepts that make medical care and health insurance different from other goods and services traded in the market. They emphasize that competitive pricing in the marketplace for insurance leads, quite rationally, to risk classification, market segmentation, and market failure. The article serves as a springboard for understanding the basis of the reforms that regulate the health insurance market in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
引用
收藏
页码:866 / 870
页数:5
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