Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment

被引:36
|
作者
Buettner, Thiess [1 ,2 ]
Overesch, Michael [3 ]
Wamser, Georg [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Erlangen Nurnberg, Lange Gasse 20, D-90403 Nurnberg, Germany
[2] CESifo, Lange Gasse 20, D-90403 Nurnberg, Germany
[3] Univ Cologne, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[4] Univ Tubingen, Mohlstr 36, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany
[5] CESifo, Mohlstr 36, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany
关键词
FDI; Corporate taxation; Profit shifting; Thin-capitalization rules; Transfer-pricing regulations; Affiliate-level data; Foreign subsidiary; Employment; Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS); OECD; THIN-CAPITALIZATION RULES; COMPETITION LESS HARMFUL; TAX COMPETITION; CORPORATE-TAXATION; INTERNAL DEBT; INCOME; IMPACT; FIRMS; MULTINATIONALS; COUNTRIES;
D O I
10.1007/s10797-017-9457-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper explores the effects of unilateral tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals' tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax deductibility, so-called thin-capitalization rules, and regulations of transfer pricing by the host country affect investment and employment of foreign subsidiaries. The results indicate that introducing a typical thin-capitalization rule or making it more tight exerts significant adverse effects on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. Moreover, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules, the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI is increased. Regulations of transfer pricing, however, are not found to exert significant effects on FDI or employment.
引用
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页码:553 / 580
页数:28
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