Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment

被引：36

作者：

Buettner, Thiess ^{[1
,2
]}

Overesch, Michael ^{[3
]}

Wamser, Georg ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Erlangen Nurnberg, Lange Gasse 20, D-90403 Nurnberg, Germany

[2] CESifo, Lange Gasse 20, D-90403 Nurnberg, Germany

[3] Univ Cologne, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50923 Cologne, Germany

[4] Univ Tubingen, Mohlstr 36, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany

[5] CESifo, Mohlstr 36, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE | 2018年 / 25卷 / 03期

关键词：

FDI; Corporate taxation; Profit shifting; Thin-capitalization rules; Transfer-pricing regulations; Affiliate-level data; Foreign subsidiary; Employment; Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS); OECD; THIN-CAPITALIZATION RULES; COMPETITION LESS HARMFUL; TAX COMPETITION; CORPORATE-TAXATION; INTERNAL DEBT; INCOME; IMPACT; FIRMS; MULTINATIONALS; COUNTRIES;

D O I：

10.1007/s10797-017-9457-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper explores the effects of unilateral tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals' tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax deductibility, so-called thin-capitalization rules, and regulations of transfer pricing by the host country affect investment and employment of foreign subsidiaries. The results indicate that introducing a typical thin-capitalization rule or making it more tight exerts significant adverse effects on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. Moreover, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules, the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI is increased. Regulations of transfer pricing, however, are not found to exert significant effects on FDI or employment.

引用

页码：553 / 580

页数：28