Informed entry in auctions

被引:3
作者
Aycinena, Diego [1 ]
Bejarano, Hernan [2 ,3 ]
Rentschler, Lucas [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rosario, Fac Econ, Bogota, Colombia
[2] Chapman Univ, Econ Sci Inst, Orange, CA USA
[3] Ctr Invest & Docencia Econ, Dept Econ, Mexico City, DF, Mexico
[4] Utah State Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Logan, UT 84322 USA
关键词
Auctions; Endogenous entry; Experiments; Bidding; PRIVATE VALUE AUCTIONS; 2ND PRICE AUCTIONS; BIDDER PREFERENCES; 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS; EXCESS ENTRY; COORDINATION; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.
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页码:175 / 205
页数:31
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