fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust

被引：98

作者：

Bigoni, Maria ^{[1
]}

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof

Le Coq, Chloe ^{[2
]}

Spagnolo, Giancarlo ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

[2] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden

[3] Univ Roma Tor Vergata, SITE, EIEF, Rome, Italy

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 43卷 / 02期

关键词：

INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; COMMUNICATION; PROGRAMS; COORDINATION; COOPERATION; ENFORCEMENT; COLLUSION;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well-run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white-collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.

引用

页码：368 / 390

页数：23

共 36 条

[1] Do antitrust laws facilitate collusion?: Experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies [J].