Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study

被引:33
作者
Chen, Yan [1 ,3 ]
Kesten, Onur [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, 105 South State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[3] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Dept Econ, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
College admissions; School choice; Immediate acceptance mechanism; Parallel mechanism; Deferred acceptance; Experiment; MECHANISMS; BOSTON; UNIVERSITY; INTERIM;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Since 2001, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from a "sequential" to a "parallel" school choice or college admissions mechanism. Inspired by this natural experiment, we evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance, IA), parallel (PA), and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms in the laboratory. We find that participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under DA, followed by PA and then DA. While stability comparisons also follow the same order, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. Regardless of the metrics, the performance of PA is robustly sandwiched between IA and DA. Furthermore, 53% of our subjects adopt an insurance strategy under PA, making them at least as well off as what they could guarantee themselves under IA. These results help explain the recent reforms in Chinese school choice and college admissions. (C) 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:83 / 100
页数:18
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