A Fairness-aware Incentive Scheme for Federated Learning

被引:132
作者
Yu, Han [1 ]
Liu, Zelei [1 ]
Liu, Yang [2 ]
Chen, Tianjian [2 ]
Cong, Mingshu [3 ]
Weng, Xi [4 ]
Niyato, Dusit [1 ]
Yang, Qiang [2 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Engn, Singapore, Singapore
[2] WeBank, Dept AI, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Hong Kong, Dept Comp Sci, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing 100080, Peoples R China
[5] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY AIES 2020 | 2020年
关键词
federated learning; incentive mechanism design;
D O I
10.1145/3375627.3375840
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In federated learning (FL), data owners "share" their local data in a privacy preserving manner in order to build a federated model, which in turn, can be used to generate revenues for the participants. However, in FL involving business participants, they might incur significant costs if several competitors join the same federation. Furthermore, the training and commercialization of the models will take time, resulting in delays before the federation accumulates enough budget to pay back the participants. The issues of costs and temporary mismatch between contributions and rewards have not been addressed by existing payoff-sharing schemes. In this paper, we propose the Federated Learning Incentivizer (FLI) payoff-sharing scheme. The scheme dynamically divides a given budget in a context-aware manner among data owners in a federation by jointly maximizing the collective utility while minimizing the inequality among the data owners, in terms of the payoff gained by them and the waiting time for receiving payoffs. Extensive experimental comparisons with five state-of-the-art payoff-sharing schemes show that FLI is the most attractive to high quality data owners and achieves the highest expected revenue for a data federation.
引用
收藏
页码:393 / 399
页数:7
相关论文
共 30 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 1978, The Belmont Report. Technical Report
  • [2] [Anonymous], 2016, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament And of the Council
  • [3] DYNAMICS OF PROFIT-SHARING GAMES
    Augustine, John
    Chen, Ning
    Elkind, Edith
    Fanelli, Angelo
    Gravin, Nick
    Shiryaev, Dmitry
    [J]. INTERNET MATHEMATICS, 2015, 11 (01) : 1 - 22
  • [4] Bonawitz K, 2019, Arxiv, DOI [arXiv:1902.01046, 10.48550/arXiv.1902.01046, DOI 10.48550/ARXIV.1902.01046]
  • [5] Practical Secure Aggregation for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
    Bonawitz, Keith
    Ivanov, Vladimir
    Kreuter, Ben
    Marcedone, Antonio
    McMahan, H. Brendan
    Patel, Sarvar
    Ramage, Daniel
    Segal, Aaron
    Seth, Karn
    [J]. CCS'17: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, 2017, : 1175 - 1191
  • [6] Christodoulou G, 2011, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V6942, P119, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-23719-5_11
  • [7] Crowdsourcing Systems on the World-Wide Web
    Doan, Anhai
    Ramakrishnan, Raghu
    Halevy, Alon Y.
    [J]. COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 2011, 54 (04) : 86 - 96
  • [8] Faltings Boi, 2017, Game Theory for Data Science: Eliciting Truthful Information
  • [9] Gao DS, 2019, IEEE INT CONF BIG DA, P2552, DOI 10.1109/BigData47090.2019.9005992
  • [10] Gollapudi Sreenivas, 2017, ESA, P1