Security Implications of a Nuclear North Korea: Crisis Stability and Imperatives for Engagement

被引:0
作者
Choi, Jong Kun [1 ]
Bae, Jong-Yun [1 ]
机构
[1] Yonsei Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Int Studies, Seoul, South Korea
关键词
Deterrence; North Korean Nuclear Weapon; Denuclearization; Engagement;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ;
摘要
The DPRK's fifth nuclear test signalled that it is a de facto nuclear state. North's nuclear capability should not be overstated, however. Denudearizing the DPRK requires a rational assessment of how its nuclear capabilities affect inter-Korean relations and the regional security order. Although the DPRK's nuclear weapons make the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia more dangerous and insecure, the existing stability of deterrence between the nuclear great powers persists, including its effects on the intentions, actions, and decisions of the two Koreas. US and ROK denuclearization policies must address directly the DPRK's security concerns thereby inducing it to freeze its nuclear program.
引用
收藏
页码:807 / 827
页数:21
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