Thought experiments, real experiments, and the expertise objection

被引：5

作者：

Hitchcock, Christopher ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91106 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2012年 / 2卷 / 02期

关键词：

Experimental philosophy; Expertise; Intuition; Philosophical methodology; Thought experiment; INTUITIONS; PHILOSOPHERS;

D O I：

10.1007/s13194-012-0051-0

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

It is a commonplace that in philosophy, intuitions supply evidence for and against philosophical theories. Recent work in experimental philosophy has brought to bear the intuitions of philosophically naive subjects in a number of different ways. One line of response to this work has been to claim that philosophers have expertise that privileges their intuitive judgments, and allows them to disregard the judgments of non-experts. This expertise is supposed to be analogous to the expertise of the mathematician or the physicist. This paper critically evaluates this appeal to philosophical expertise.

引用

页码：205 / 218

页数：14

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