DOES HIGHER RATE OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE MEAN LOWER INFLATION RATE?

被引:0
作者
Cernohorsky, Jan [1 ]
Knezackova, Radka [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pardubice, Fac Econ & Adm, Inst Econ Sci, Pardubice 53210, Czech Republic
来源
FINANCE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS IN SCIENCE, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE | 2013年
关键词
central bank; inflation rate; central bank independence; MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE; DISCRETION; RULES;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There is a discussion about the degree of central bank independence in professional circles for many years. This discussion comes out from years when central banks were not too independent and did not have too much autonomy in the implementation of monetary policy. At this time number of works was created dealing with the effects of central bank independence on inflation rate. Under current conditions, usually in strict separation of fiscal and monetary policy, conditions have changed fundamentally. This paper is based on assumptions set out in earlier in this paper cited articles. Therefore the aim of this paper is to verify the hypothesis that higher degree of central bank independence means lower inflation rate in the economy in today's conditions.
引用
收藏
页码:209 / 220
页数:12
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