Techno-Social Energy Infrastructure Siting: Sustainable Energy Modeling Programming (SEMPro)

被引:9
作者
Abdollahian, Mark [1 ]
Yang, Zining [1 ]
Nelson, Hal [1 ]
机构
[1] Claremont Grad Univ, Sch Polit & Econ, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
来源
JASSS-THE JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SIMULATION | 2013年 / 16卷 / 03期
关键词
Infrastructure Siting; Policy Informatics; Computational Economics; Community Based Organizations; Citizen Participation; Game Theory; COALITION-FORMATION; TRANSMISSION-LINES; PERCEPTIONS;
D O I
10.18564/jasss.2199
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Technical, environment, social, economic and political constraints are critical barriers to the development of new renewable energy supplies. SEMPro is an agent-based, predictive analytics model of energy siting policy in the techno-social space that simulates how competing interests shape siting outcomes to identify beneficial policy for sustainable energy infrastructure. Using a high voltage transmission line as a case study, we integrate project engineering and institutional factors with GIS data on land use attributes and US Census residential demographics. We focus on modeling citizen attitudinal, Community Based Organization (CBO) emergence and behavioral diffusion of support and opposition with Bilateral Shapley Values from cooperative game theory. We also simulate the competitive policy process and interaction between citizens, CBOs and regulatory, utility and governmental stakeholders using non-cooperative game theory. We find CBO formation, utility message and NGO messaging have a positive impact on citizen comments submitted as a part of the Environmental Impact Statement process, while project need and procedure have a negative impact. As citizens communicate and exchange political opinions across greater distances with more neighbors, less CBOs form but those that do are more effective, increasing the number of messages citizens send.
引用
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页数:12
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