Central Bank Design

被引：57
作者：
Reis, Ricardo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES | 2013年 / 27卷 / 04期
关键词：
MONETARY-POLICY; INTEREST-RATES; BALANCE-SHEET; INFLATION; COMMUNICATION; RULES; DISCRETION; FRAMEWORK; CONSENSUS; PRICES;
D O I：
10.1257/jep.27.4.17
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Starting with a blank slate, how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the United States? This paper explores the question of how to design a central bank, drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the Fed got to be what it is today or the short-term political constraints it has faced at various times. The goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade-offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design.
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页码：17 / 43
页数：27
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