Central Bank Design

被引：57

作者：

Reis, Ricardo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES | 2013年 / 27卷 / 04期

关键词：

MONETARY-POLICY; INTEREST-RATES; BALANCE-SHEET; INFLATION; COMMUNICATION; RULES; DISCRETION; FRAMEWORK; CONSENSUS; PRICES;

D O I：

10.1257/jep.27.4.17

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Starting with a blank slate, how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the United States? This paper explores the question of how to design a central bank, drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the Fed got to be what it is today or the short-term political constraints it has faced at various times. The goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade-offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design.

引用

页码：17 / 43

页数：27

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