Theory and evidence on the political economy of the minimum wage

被引:41
作者
Sober, RS [1 ]
机构
[1] W Virginia Univ, Morgantown, WV 26506 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/250078
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines how closely the minimum wage has been set to the most popularly stated goals of minimum wage policy. I first estimate these goals: the minimum-wage rate at which the relevant labor demand is unitary elastic-maximizing the total earnings of minimum-wage workers (about $5.35)-and the level that would lift a typical minimum-wage workers family out of poverty (about $5.17). I can reject that actual minimum-wage policy has been driven by a desire to achieve these goals and find that a simple interest group model best explains the historical path of the minimum-wage rate.
引用
收藏
页码:761 / 785
页数:25
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