You Can Enter but You Cannot Leave...: US Securities markets and foreign firms

被引:53
作者
Marosi, Andras [1 ]
Massoud, Nadia [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alberta, Sch Business, Edmonton, AB T6G 2M7, Canada
[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01402.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Although a number of prior papers have argued the benefits to foreign firms of cross-listing their shares in the U.S., the number of foreign firms exiting U.S. capital markets has been increasing. This has occurred despite the difficulties foreign firms face in deregistering from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This paper examines the reasons underlying this trend. One of our main findings is that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has reduced the net benefits of a U.S. listing and registration, particularly for smaller foreign firms with lower trading volume and stronger insider control.
引用
收藏
页码:2477 / 2506
页数:30
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