SCRUTINIZE ME, PLEASE! THE DRIVERS, MANIFESTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

Voluntary accountability, where people and organizations willingly subject themselves to scrutiny, seems counterintuitive. The common understanding is that increased accountability has negative consequences for the accountor; and so why would anyone voluntarily seek accountability when it is not required? Current explanations hold that external pressures can explain accountability-seeking behaviour, and the proponents are not convinced by the argument that it is beneficial to the accountor. In contrast, this study finds that accountability often serves the accountor's interests. A six-part typology of accountor-beneficial motivations is developed, the empirical adequacy of which is tested through extensive case studies. The results show that public accountability can be a means rather than a burden in the hands of political executive leaders. These findings challenge the conventional principal-agent understanding of accountability and suggest that the study of the poorly understood practice of democratic accountability would benefit from a more leader-centric perspective.