Does dialect similarity add value to banks? Evidence from China

被引:46
作者
Bian, Wenlong [1 ]
Ji, Yang [2 ,3 ]
Zhang, Hao [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Grad Sch China, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Xiamen Univ, Sch Econ, Finance Dept, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China
[3] Xiamen Univ, Chow Ctr Econ Res, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China
[4] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Sch Finance, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[5] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Southern China Inst Fortune Management Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Dialect similarity; Cultural revolution; Bank performance; AGENCY COSTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE; FIRM; OWNERSHIP; LANGUAGE; COMPENSATION; PAY; BEHAVIOR; FINANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.02.013
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the value of language, as an important dimension of culture, to banks. Based on a unique hand-collected dataset of Chinese commercial banks and a county-level dialect dataset, we find that a higher degree of dialect similarity between the chairman and the CEO is associated with a higher return on assets, a higher return on equity, and a lower cost-to-income ratio, suggesting that dialect similarity plays a positive role in improving bank performance. Further analyses show that dialect similarity has no significant association with bank risk and bank expansion. In addition, it does not cause higher CEO pay or lower pay-performance sensitivity. These results indicate that dialect similarity does not lower the monitoring effectiveness. We also investigate the relation between dialect similarity and banks' agency costs and the results show that dialect similarity reduces agency costs significantly. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of dialect similarity, the separation of the "dialect level effect", and the potential endogeneity of dialect similarity. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:226 / 241
页数:16
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