Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study

被引:83
作者
Bednar, Jenna [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Yan [3 ]
Liu, Tracy Xiao [3 ]
Page, Scott [1 ,2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Polit Sci, Ctr Study Complex Syst, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Santa Fe Inst, Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA
[3] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[4] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ctr Study Complex Syst, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Multiple games; Behavioral spillover; Cognitive load; Entropy; Experiment; COORDINATION; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.009
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find that prevalent strategies in games with low outcome entropy are more likely to be used in the games with high outcome entropy, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings suggest that people do not treat strategic situations in isolation, but may instead develop heuristics that they apply across games. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:12 / 31
页数:20
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