A marriage matching mechanism menagerie

被引：14

作者：

Boudreau, James W. ^{[1
]}

Knoblauch, Vicki ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Rio Grande Valley, Dept Econ & Finance, Edinburg, TX 78539 USA

[2] Univ Connecticut, Dept Econ, Mansfield, CT USA

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2017年 / 45卷 / 01期

关键词：

Matching; Assignment; Social welfare; SCHOOL CHOICE; STABILITY; PRICE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.001

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

For each of several measures of social welfare we present a marriage matching mechanism that produces a welfare maximizing matching, and our basic approach generalizes to many other welfare measures. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：68 / 71

页数：4

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